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Abstract Suppose a speaker states, “a fetus is a person,” to which her conver-
sational partner replies, “a fetus is not a person,” and that their claims go beyond
merely disagreeing (descriptively) about what the concept PERSON means. That
is, the speakers are actually disagreeing (normatively) about what PERSON should
mean, highlighting the dispute’s normative, metalinguistic dimension. David Plun-
kett refers to this dispute as a ‘metalinguistic negotiation’. There seems to be a gap
between metalinguistic negotiation and the field of Conceptual Ethics, regarding
the extent to which metalinguistic negotiation is connected to Conceptual Ethics.
Thismissing linkmotivatedme to explore if metalinguistic negotiation can help with
Conceptual Ethics. I argue that the extent to which metalinguistic negotiation can
help Conceptual Ethics, in terms of unifying Conceptual Ethics’ projects to achieve
shared goals, depends on which model of metalinguistic negotiation we utilise.
To explore my argument, I do six main things. First, I define Conceptual Ethics
and offer an example of a defect concept. Second, I outline and discuss Plunkett’s
view, his model of metalinguistic negotiation, its strengths, and how it helps Con-
ceptual Ethics. Third, I explore Plunkett’s model’s main weaknesses, identifying a di-
lemma. Fourth, I briefly consider and object to a suggestion attempting to salvage
Plunkett’s model. Fifth, I propose a reinterpreted model of metalinguistic negoti-
ation, the Elasticity Model, utilising Speech Act Pluralism. In the proposal section,
I introduce Speech Act Pluralism, bridge Speech Act Pluralism and metalinguistic
negotiation, and outline the Elasticity Model. Thereupon, I investigate the Elasticity
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Model’s strengths and the ways in which it could help Conceptual Ethics. In partic-
ular, I attempt to demonstrate how the Elasticity Model can help Conceptual Ethics
more than Plunkett’s model can, particularly as the ElasticityModel avoids Plunkett’s
dilemma. Lastly, I raise and respond to numerous objections against my position.
1 Introduction
Suppose a speaker, S11, states, “Fs are G,” to which her conversational partner, S2,
replies, “Fs are not G,” and that their claims go beyond merely disagreeing (descript-
ively) about what the concept Gmeans. That is, the interlocutors are actually disagree-
ing (normatively) about what G should mean, highlighting the dispute’s normative,
metalinguistic dimension. To David PlunkeĴ, this dispute is a metalinguistic nego-
tiation (MLN)2. There seems to be a gap between MLN and the field of Conceptual
Ethics3, regarding the extent to which MLN is connected to Conceptual Ethics. This
missing link motivated me to explore if MLN can help with Conceptual Ethics. Taking
Conceptual Ethics to be a “sparse and scaĴered field,”4 I believe it requires more unity
to strengthen its “potential [. . . and help] conceptual development”5. I argue that the
extent to which MLN6 can help Conceptual Ethics, in terms of unifying Conceptual
Ethics’ projects to achieve shared goals, depends on which MLN model we utilise.
To explore my argument, I do six main things. First, I define Conceptual Ethics and
offer an example of a defect concept. Second, I outline and discuss PlunkeĴ’s view,
his MLN model, its strengths, and how it helps Conceptual Ethics. Then, I explore
his model’s main weaknesses, identifying a dilemma. Fourth, I briefly consider and
object to a suggestion aĴempting to salvage PlunkeĴ’s model. Thereupon, I propose a
different model of MLN, the Elasticity Model, utilising Speech Act Pluralism. Lastly, I
raise and respond to several objections.
1. I refer to speakers as S1, S2, and so forth.
2. I explore PlunkeĴ’s model, as it is currently the most influential one.
3. I treat Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering as synonymous, as their definitions remain
open questions. See Alexis Burgess et al., Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2020), 2 for further discussion.
4. Alexis Burgess and David PlunkeĴ, “Conceptual Ethics I,” Philosophy Compass 8, no. 12 (2013),
1096.
5. Ibid., 1096-7.
6. I presuppose that MLNs exist and occur often.
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2 Conceptual Ethics and Concepts
Conceptual Ethics asks, “which concepts should we use?”7 In response, philosoph-
ers of Conceptual Ethics pursue diverse projects, which aim to improve our repres-
entational devices (such as concepts8 and words, which arguably possess defects).
Given the diversity of Conceptual Ethics, I define it broadly as “(i) [t]he assessment
of representational devices [not only concepts], (ii) reflections on and proposal for
how to improve representational devices, and (iii) efforts to implement the proposed
improvements”9. In particular, concepts can have multidimensional defects, includ-
ing semantic defects, socio-political defects, and inconsistency (enabling logical para-
doxes), and one concept can entail numerous defects. AĴempting to fix concepts is
thus complex.
For example, consider MARRIAGE. Assuming10 concepts have intensions (sets of
principles picking out extensions) and extensions (references in the external world),
the meaning of ‘marriage’ as commonly understood is often restricted to occurring
only between heterosexual couples (indicating that MARRIAGE’s intension includes
only heterosexual couples). Therefore, MARRIAGE’s intension picks out heterosexual
couples, whilst excluding homosexual couples and polygamists. So, if used in policy,
‘marriage’ creates legal constraints on whom and how many people one can wed. For
example, polygamy is illegal in the United States. Such socio-political defects require
fixing, which is where a conceptual ethicist’s task begins. She can aĴempt to engineer
MARRIAGE by revising its meaning (revisionary conceptual engineering), replacing
it with surrogates (replacement conceptual engineering), or eliminating it from our
language (eliminativist conceptual engineering).
3 Plunkett’s Approach to Metalinguistic Negotiation
Within Conceptual Ethics’ realm, philosophers often seem to dispute what a concept
means, creating a sense of disunity in the field and, if they are aĴempting to engineer
the same concept, lacking cohesion between their projects. On PlunkeĴ’s view, such
first-order, descriptive disputes concerning an expression’s literal content (canonical
disputes) are oftentimes not about literally expressed content (non-canonical disputes)
and are metalinguistic. PlunkeĴ argues that speakers can use “a word to communic-
ate [their] views about the meaning of that word. These views can either be [about
7. David PlunkeĴ, “Which Concepts ShouldWe Use?: Metalinguistic Negotiations and The Method-
ology of Philosophy,” Inquiry 58, no. 7-8 (2015).
8. I focus on concept-based Conceptual Ethics, as PlunkeĴ does.
9. Herman Cappelen and David PlunkeĴ, “A Guided Tour of Conceptual Engineering and Concep-
tual Ethics,” in Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics, Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and
David PlunkeĴ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 3.
10. I recognise the ongoing wider debates about concepts.
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descriptive issues regarding] what a word does mean or about the normative issue of
what it should mean”11. I return to PlunkeĴ’s focus on usage, first explaining the gen-
eral descriptive/normative divide within the domain of non-canonical disputes. Plun-
keĴ distinguishes between metalinguistic disputes and MLNs, claiming that not all
metalinguistic disputes are MLNs as some are purely descriptive (for example, those
involving context-sensitive terms such as ‘tall’12). Therefore, MLNs are a sub-set of
metalinguistic disputes.
In order to therefore determine whether a dispute is a MLN, PlunkeĴ proposes
four main criteria. First, is it a dispute, namely, “a linguistic exchange that appears to
express a disagreement”13? Second, does it truly express a disagreement? Third, do
the speakers mean different things with (at least) one term? Fourth, is it normative?
PlunkeĴ qualifies his criteriawith examples of evidencewhich can help pinpointMLN.
For example, PlunkeĴ’s third condition (C3) requires “good evidence that speakers in
the dispute mean different things by (at least) one of the terms in that dispute”14. The
‘good evidence’ is that speakers consistently use the same termdifferently “in the same
(non-defective) conditions”15. Regarding condition four (C4), PlunkeĴ notes that the
dispute is normative if it
isn’t just about descriptive information about what a word does mean, or
how it is used. [. . . ] [Evidence] here would be that speakers persist in their
dispute even when they agree on the facts about a term’s current meaning
or current use.16
4 The General Strengths of Plunkett’s Model
Initially, PlunkeĴ’s argument seems convincing. An immediate strength of PlunkeĴ’s
view is his strong prima facie case for MLN’s existence and frequent occurrence. In
particular, PlunkeĴ foregrounds disputes’ possible normative dimension, which is an
important feature of MLN. For example, S1’s claim, “a fetus is a person,” to which S2
counters, “you are mistaken, a fetus is not a person,” may initially seem to concern the
current meaning or use of ‘person’. However, by applying PlunkeĴ’s criteria, one can
deem the dispute normative as, arguably, the speakers are disputing what PERSON
should mean, in virtue of observing their differing meanings of ‘person’ through their
differing usages of ‘person’. Due to normativity’s defining importance for MLN, C4 is
thus vital for MLN’s existence.
11. PlunkeĴ, “Which Concepts Should We Use?,” 833.
12. Ibid., 834-8.
13. Ibid., 847.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
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Expanding upon my above claim, C4’s emphasis on normativity highlights MLN’s
relation to Conceptual Ethics, entailing the potential for conceptual ethicists to expli-
citly engage in MLNs, thereby furthering their goals (for example, replacing MAR-
RIAGE to improve social justice). C4 thus seemingly answers the title question, simul-
taneously offering to explain how: philosophers often engage in MLNs and, if aware
of this (perhaps after looking for the specified evidence), they can realise what they are
truly disputing and find a solution. As PlunkeĴ and Sundell note,
many disagreements about conceptual ethics are not expressed explicitly.
Metalinguistic negotiations are the most important instances of this impli-
cit [. . . ] kind. [They] may not at first glance appear — either to the speak-
ers themselves or to the theorist — to reflect disagreements about concept
choice.17
Therefore, if disputing philosophers utilise PlunkeĴ’s criteria to reflect upon their
disputes, they may find that their disputes express normative disagreements about
concepts. So, is the missing link problem solved?
5 The Weaknesses of Plunkett’s Model
Despite C4’s strength, PlunkeĴ’s model faces two main problems: scope and an in-
compatibility. Regarding scope, all intractable disputes seem to be MLNs. Suppose
S1 and S2 dispute whether or not a hedge is a tree, and that their dispute expresses
a disagreement. Assuming their dispute persists beyond the facts about the current
meaning or usage of ‘hedge’, their dispute could be classified as a MLN. Evidence for
this claim is that, in this scenario, S1 uses ‘hedge’ to refer exclusively to shrubs, whilst
S2 uses ‘hedge’ to refer exclusively to small trees. So, if such everyday disputes can be
MLNs on PlunkeĴ’s view, howmany other disputes areMLNs? PlunkeĴ simply states
that discerning this is “no easy task”18.
I return to the scope worry later, focusing my analysis on an incompatibility
between C3 and C4, which I argue undermines PlunkeĴ’s model’s coherence and, sub-
sequently, its ability to help Conceptual Ethics. Whilst C3 specifies that speakers can
mean different thingswith a term, evidenced by their differing usages of it19, C4’s evid-
ence (for normativity) is that “speakers persist in their dispute even when they agree
17. David PlunkeĴ and Tim Sundell, “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative
Terms,” Philosophers’ Imprint 13, no. 23 (2013), 3.
18. PlunkeĴ, “Which Concepts Should We Use?,” 850.
19. PlunkeĴ seemingly adheres to semantic holism (every change in use changes meaning), character-
ising language as hyper-sensitive to usage change. Thanks to Dr Patrick Greenough for highlighting
this point in a discussion.
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on the facts about a term’s current meaning or current use”20. To PlunkeĴ, the facts
are either about their usage(s) or their speech community’s, and the speakers nego-
tiate “how they should use the term going forward,”21 simpliciter. However, I won-
der how the speakers can agree on the facts about a given term’s current meaning or
use (hereupon, current meaning and use facts are referred to as ‘the facts’), given that
they can mean different things with the term. I believe this incompatibility arises from
PlunkeĴ’s overly strong Use Theory of Meaning. Whereas the Use Theory of Meaning
generally claims that use determines meaning, PlunkeĴ’s aforementioned conditions
imply a bi-entailment: use determines meaning and any difference in meaning is a
difference in use. This bi-entailment seems problematic for two main reasons.
First, as C4 allows speakers to agree on their usages’ divergence, PlunkeĴ impli-
citly suggests use facts22 are intrinsically normative rather than descriptive, as decid-
ing upon a term’s meaning would involve selecting one speaker’s use over another’s.
Given bi-entailment, this also suggests meaning facts are intrinsically normative. For
example, utilising PlunkeĴ’s linguist example, a linguist can state F “just means”23 G,
given what G is (descriptively). This implies that in a MLN, an expert on terms, such
as a linguist, will have their usage of a term accepted and a non-expert’s usage will be
rejected, so the facts ultimately depend on who states them. By extension, considering
PlunkeĴ’s model’s implications for Conceptual Ethics, as C3 permits meaning differ-
ence and PlunkeĴ neither specifies exit rules nor how to arrive at a solution (deciding
which concept to use), his model seems impractical if we consider unifying projects
more towards common goals, as disputes and disunity can indefinitely continue.
Second, considering a dispute about PERSON, C3 and C4 allow S1 and S2 to agree
that S1 uses ‘person’ to apply to fetuses and S2does not. If their dispute persists beyond
such agreement, it is a MLN, supporting PlunkeĴ’s position. Given C4’s stipulation,
PlunkeĴ would conclude from this that the speakers are negotiating what PERSON
should mean simpliciter, rather than what PERSON should mean to each individual.
However, in order to claim the former, PlunkeĴ would need to allow for ‘person’ to
possess a shared social (public) meaning (which is then disputed in the MLN), yet C3
does not allow for this and C4 stipulates that the facts (such as speakers’ diverging
usages) about ‘person’ must be agreed upon to make their dispute normative.
To clarify my aforementioned point, as the speakers can agree they mean different
things with ‘person’ (individually), how can PlunkeĴ claim they are disputing what
‘person’ means (simpliciter)? PlunkeĴ overlooks the possibility that if speakers agree
that their usages diverge, their agreement does not equate to one on a term’s (general)
current meaning and use facts. My objection creates a dilemma for PlunkeĴ: if he
adheres to C3, he loses C4 (and cannot bridge the gap to Conceptual Ethics) as there
20. PlunkeĴ, “Which Concepts Should We Use?,” 847.
21. Ibid., 840.
22. I wonder if this applies to all use facts or only to some.
23. PlunkeĴ, “Which Concepts Should We Use?,” 842.
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arguably cannot be agreement on the facts. If he keeps C4, he cannot advocatemeaning
difference (key to his model). Thus, although C4 is crucial for MLN, PlunkeĴ cannot
address themissing link fully. Therefore, we can either fix PlunkeĴ’smodel or propose
a meaning sameness model.
6 Salvaging Plunkett’s Model?
If we aĴempt to salvage PlunkeĴ’s view, one possible approach is Simple Contextu-
alism as, on one reading, meaning difference could imply terms’ context-sensitivity.
MLNs concern “how to best use a word relative to a context,”24 which supports this
connection. Simple Contextualism claims that speakers share a term’s conventional
linguistic meaning. A conventional linguistic meaning is incomplete25, so a given con-
text’s features complete a term’s semantic value. Therefore, one could argue that re-
quiring context to fix content accounts for a context-sensitive meaning difference no-
tion, implying a reliance on contexts to derive complete meanings. Therefore, a con-
ventional linguistic meaning without a specified context can create the impression of
speakers meaning different things with a term, accommodating for C3.
Whilst an intriguing suggestion, I object to it on two fronts: first, if someone made
the above argument, theywould overlook SimpleContextualism’s single-content view.
Simple Contextualism is therefore actually an aĴractive option for meaning same-
ness rather than meaning difference, suggesting a possible single-content contextu-
alist MLN. That is, contrasting PlunkeĴ, propounding meaning sameness arguably
accounts for C4 (and, thus, normativity), bridging the missing link and solving Plun-
keĴ’s dilemma as speakers can agree or disagree about what a wordmeans26, since one
meaning exists. Notwithstanding, this approach may produce a dilemma for PlunkeĴ
insofar as that he could not propound meaning difference. In conjunction, as PlunkeĴ
claims context-sensitive terms are insufficiently normative (for example, ‘tall’), he may
reject Simple Contextualism as a viable alternative. Second, even if I utilised Simple
Contextualism to construct ameaning samenessmodel, Iwould be commiĴed to claim-
ing that all words are context-sensitive. Considering the evidence suggesting the con-
trary, I find this too ambitious a claim to defend here, particularly as I seek to find a
model entailing minimal baggage.
PlunkeĴ’s dilemma and Simple Contextualism’s limitations lead me to explore my
second option: proposing a meaning sameness model, the Elasticity Model, aiming to
avoid PlunkeĴ’s problems. An important preliminary is that I do not intend the Elasti-
24. PlunkeĴ and Sundell, “Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms,” 3.
25. JosephAlmog et al., Themes fromKaplan (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1989) discusses Kaplan’s
character and content distinction.
26. PlunkeĴ could argue that this captures canonical disputes. However, I think that a ‘simple contex-
tualist MLN’ could demonstrate how terms’ incomplete meanings elongate disputes.
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city Model to be a flawless model. Adhering to my paper’s purpose, I simply explore
how the Elasticity Model could help Conceptual Ethics more than PlunkeĴ’s model.
Therefore, I consider some objections after presenting the Elasticity Model, which in-
dicates that the Elasticity Model requires more conceptual development than I can of-
fer in the space of my paper. To briefly outline the Elasticity Model’s main claim, it
holds that interlocutors in aMLN are not directly negotiating about what our concepts
should mean, rather, they are negotiating what their uĴered sentences (embedding
concepts) about concepts should be saying. More specifically, speakers are negotiat-
ing which expressed proposition they should associate with an uĴered sentence27. I
elaborate on the Elasticity Model after introducing its theoretical background (Speech
Act Pluralism).
7 Speech Act Pluralism
I utilise Speech Act Pluralism for MLN as I find PlunkeĴ’s focus on usage important
because speakers use the terms they uĴer in their disputes. Speech Act Pluralism helps
me foreground and maintain a focus on usage, albeit differently to PlunkeĴ, as Speech
Act Pluralism claims “no one thing is said [. . . ] by an uĴerance; rather, indefinitely
many propositions28 are said, asserted29, claimed, stated”30. Therefore, what is said
when a speaker uĴers a sentence (for example, of the form ‘X is F’) in a context of
uĴerance expresses multiple propositions (P1, P2, P3, and so forth). Speech Act Plur-
alism thus distinguishes between a sentence’s literal meaning and speaker meaning
(namely, “what a person means in using [a sentence]”31).
For example, Speech Act Pluralism32 would claim that a speaker asserting “Trump
is the US President” in a context of uĴerance expresses multiple propositions, such as
Donald is the US President, Melania’s husband is our President, The Trump Organisation’s
owner is the President, and so forth, due to a one-many saying relation. Specifically,
the saying relation, relativised to a single context, is one-many. Moreover, “pluralism
about speech act content applies [both] to sentences that report something about what
speakers’ uĴerances say [and] to the reported speakers’ uĴerances,”33 which I expand
upon below.
27. For my paper’s purposes, I only refer to the uĴerances of sentences.
28. Every expressed proposition has truth conditions (necessary and sufficient conditions), illustrated
below.
29. Speakers produce speech acts by, for example, asserting, “Fs are G.”
30. Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Insensitive Semantics: a Defense of Semantic Minimalism and
Speech Act Pluralism (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), 4.
31. Gillian Russell and Delia Graff Fara, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Language (New York:
Routledge, 2015), 79.
32. Although this view’s accuracy is contested, I believe that thewayweuĴer sentences anduse reports
in natural language supports Speech Act Pluralism. I aim to demonstrate this through my examples.
33. Cappelen and Lepore, Insensitive Semantics, 199.
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Aside from an interlocutor’s uĴerance in a context of uĴerance, also referred to
as the reported context (what is said), Speech Act Pluralism considers “the context of
those who say or think about what the speaker said, [so] the context of those who
report what’s said by the uĴerance can [partly] determine what was said by that uĴer-
ance”34. Therefore, if S1 asserts, “X is F,” this “does not stand in a single one:one re-
lationship with some indirect speech report [(hereupon, ‘report’)], but rather explodes
into a plethora of possible indirect speech acts”35. So, if S2 reports on S1’s uĴerance,
S2’s report selects one of its expressed propositions. Therefore, the expressed propos-
itions (multiple sayings), which expressed proposition a speaker reports on, and what
is saliently said dependpartly “on features quite external to that [uĴered] sentence, like
the [given] conversational context [. . . ] and the (shared) background assumptions of
speakers and [hearers]”36. Some reports may therefore communicate (in the reporting
context) “things only tangentially connected with the meaning of the sentence pro-
duced,”37 and which expressed proposition is most felicitous to report on ultimately
depends on the speakers’ freedom to select one. Thus, both uĴerances’ and reports’
flexibility stem from the one-many saying relation’s flexibility38.
8 Initial Worry
Initially, onemay perceive a fundamental problemwith SpeechAct Pluralism, namely,
why are some reports successful and others not? Is this context-sensitivity? Does
Speech Act Pluralism share Simple Contextualism’s limitations? I contend that one
can distinguish between the two views. Whilst Speech Act Pluralism proposes that an
uĴerance produced in a context of uĴerance expresses multiple propositions, Simple
Contextualism focuses on terms’ context-sensitivity and how contexts complete terms’
meanings. Figure 1, which I have produced, underscores this difference:
34. Ibid., 4-5.
35. Emma Borg,Minimal Semantics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 114-5.
36. Ibid., 115.
37. Ibid.
38. The ‘elasticity’ of ‘Elasticity Model’ denotes this flexibility.
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Figure 1: Speech Act Pluralism’s and Simple Contextualism’s differences regarding
context
9 Using Speech Act Pluralism for Metalinguistic Ne-
gotiation: the Elasticity Model
With the Elasticity Model’s background established and the contextualism worry dis-
pelled, I now explore how MLN could work on a Speech Act Pluralism view. First, I
propose its MLN criteria: are the interlocutors engaged in a dispute? Does it express a
disagreement? Is there evidence that the interlocutorsmean the same thingwith a term
used in a sentence and are disputing the uĴered sentence’s expressed propositions
(EC3)? Is it normative (EC4)? My criteria suggest MLNs may not always overtly in-
volve disputes (in PlunkeĴ’s sense) as the expressed propositions, rather than a term’s
meaning, aremultiple, and speakersmust select what is saliently said among themany
sayings39. Considering PlunkeĴ’s Secretariat example, wherein S1 says, “Secretariat is
an athlete,” and S2 disagrees, PlunkeĴ argues that the speakers are negotiating what
ATHLETE should mean. For S1, non-human animals can be athletes, whereas, for S2,
they cannot, and this meaning difference is evidenced by S1 using ‘athlete’ to refer
to Secretariat, a horse, whereas S2 does not. In contrast, the Elasticity Model views
the speakers as negotiating what “Secretariat is an athlete” should be saying (what
the most relevant expressed proposition is for their MLN). Thus, ‘athlete’ possesses a
single (shared) meaning and S1’s uĴerance of “Secretariat is an athlete,” with respect
to a context of uĴerance, expresses multiple, differing propositions. Moreover, an ut-
terance’s multiple expressed propositions can account for how interlocutors seem to
mean different things when they uĴer a sentence using the same (disputed) term, ac-
counting for an initial impression of meaning difference.
39. What is said does not imply that speakers simply talk past each other as, despite shared semantic-
content, disputes persist.
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Nonetheless, one may question whether the interlocutors are aware a MLN is oc-
curring. Moreover, how can speakers decide upon what is said given this complicated
view and that there is “no one correct answer to what was said by an uĴerance, [nor. . .
] to what was said by a report of [the uĴerance]”40? I suggest that a filtering mechan-
ism is needed, such as MLN referees. Arguably, if interlocutors are aware of engaging
in MLNs, they could referee themselves, provided they know an uĴered sentence has
multiple expressed propositions. Referees could choose the most felicitous saying as
“intuitively we don’t want to countenance all of them as semantically informative,”41
giving the referees a demanding decision-making role. I address some practical ques-
tions about such decision-making below.
10 The Elasticity Model and Conceptual Ethics
To test the Elasticity Model, I consider an example42 pertaining to Conceptual Ethics
and connect it to Conceptual Ethics projects. Suppose S1 uĴers, “x iswhite” in a context
of uĴerance, expressing propositions P1, P2, and so on. We could think of the truth
conditions for ‘x is white’ as ‘‘x is white’ is true if and only if (iff) x has a reflectance
property greater than or equal to (≥ ) n’. So, P1’s truth condition is ‘x is white iff
x has a reflectance property ≥ 0’, whereas P2’s is ‘x is white iff x has a reflectance
property ≥ 1’, and different speakers can report on different expressed propositions,
“all of which may be licensed by [S1’s] production of [“x is white” ]”43. The speakers
are thus negotiating the boundary for whiteness and, considering EC3, there is shared
meaning insofar as what S1 and S2 mean byWHITE is the same, however, their choice
of what is saliently said differs.
For example, S1 argues, “x iswhite,” satisfying P1’s truth conditions (a lower stand-
ard), whereas S2 does not think x is white because it must satisfy P2’s truth conditions
(a higher standard). Regarding EC4, one may argue that MLNs express merely verbal
disputes as ‘white’ has one meaning, so the speakers could be talking past each other.
However, I argue that normativity is present, as what should be saliently said is norm-
atively disputed. That is, the Elasticity Model proposes a MLN that concerns which of
the many truth conditions we should associate with a sentence, in a context of uĴer-
ance. Thus, in certain contexts, S1 and S2 can agree because of their shared meaning of
WHITE and by deciding what an uĴerance about WHITE should say for their MLN’s
purposes. It is a further, practical question as to what the most felicitous saying is,
which suggests seĴing standards and artificial constraints on these, depending on the
MLN. Arguably, speakers must agree upon which standards are appropriate in which
condition(s), which I explore below.
40. Cappelen and Lepore, Insensitive Semantics, 199.
41. Borg,Minimal Semantics, 115.
42. As I aim to challenge PlunkeĴ’s account, I too do not consider concepts such as TRUTH.
43. Borg,Minimal Semantics, 114-5.
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Applying my example to a wider discussion wherein theorists consider normat-
ive issues about our conceptual choices of racial terms, “x is white” may hold if the
theorists adopt a low standard (perhaps for everyday discussions involving WHITE).
However, if engaging in an eliminativist project onWHITE, demanding standardsmay
be adopted for the MLN, whereby “x is white” does not hold. For example, Appiah,
an eliminativist about RACE, advocates that “there are no races”44 as no referents exist
for it. Appiah claims “the evil [. . . ] is done by the concept,”45 deeming RACE de-
fective, especially when racial terms are used in policies to oppress certain groups of
people. An Appiah-like eliminativist would thus argue that racial terms should not
be used, as they do not refer to anything. In contrast, racial constructivists perceive
races as socially constructed, leading many to argue that we should keep RACE (and
racial terms), as removing it leaves out “something [. . . ] causally or socially import-
ant”46. For example, Root argues that labelling races through terms such as ‘white’ and
‘black’ is “conceptually or logically required”47 to understand the (oftentimes harmful)
role these terms have played and continue to play in societies. Therefore, theorists such
as Root hold that ‘race’ and “racial terms pick out groups of persons in virtue of either
superficial or culturally local features (or both),”48 contrasting Appiah’s claims.
Utilising the aforementioned theorists’ diverging perspectives, suppose S1 from
my WHITE example is a Root-like theorist and S2 is a Appiah-like theorist, and both
desire to further social justice in different ways. Whereas S1 aims to revise WHITE’s
intension, S2 holds that WHITE is so defective that it must be removed. Given Speech
Act Pluralism, if S1 argues, “Jim is white,” her uĴerance expresses multiple proposi-
tions (depending on what is present in the context of uĴerance and reporting context)
including Jim is not white49, which S2 may decide is saliently said (given S2’s views).
Thus, which expressed proposition either speaker reports about the other’s uĴerance
whilst refereeing depends on what they deem most felicitous to report. Furthermore,
the interlocutors could decide what is saliently said in their MLN by seĴing standards.
That is, they decide which expressed proposition (and its truth conditions) are correct
for an uĴerance about WHITE for their MLN’s purposes50. Consequently, their dis-
pute may be long and confusing51. By extension, regarding my example, the Elasticity
Model highlights that if a revisionist and an eliminativist agree on a standard, this may
impact one of their projects more than the other’s. For example, if they agree “Jim is
44. KwameAnthonyAppiah, “TheUncompletedArgument: Du Bois and the Illusion of Race,”Critical
Inquiry 12, no. 1 (1985), 35.
45. Ibid.
46. Ron Mallon, “‘Race’: Normative, Not Metaphysical or Semantic,” Ethics 116, no. 3 (2006), 534.
47. Ibid., 536.
48. Ibid.
49. Some Speech Act Pluralism theorists find arguing that one uĴered sentence, as used in a single
context, can express incompatible propositions controversial, whilst others remain neutral on this mat-
ter.
50. Essentially, they decide how to categorise our world correctly, implying a deflated sense of norm-
ativity.
51. This is quite representative of our drawn-out disputes.
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white” expresses Jim is white, the eliminativist may need to rethink his project52.
Arguably, my above example demonstrates the Elasticity Model’s applicability,
as the interlocutors mean same thing with WHITE and are disputing what the uĴer-
ance “Jim is white” should be saying, rather than what WHITE’s meaning should be
(fulfilling EC3). Considering EC4, I view this dispute as normative because the inter-
locutors are disputing what the uĴered sentence should be saying, not what it means
or says. Therefore, I believe the example highlights that the ElasticityModel can be ap-
plied toConceptual Ethics-style disputes, riddingMLNof PlunkeĴ’s dilemma (as there
is a shared meaning of ‘white’) and Simple Contextualism’s limitations (meanings are
not incomplete). Moreover, the Elasticity Model can bridgeMLN and Conceptual Eth-
ics as, contrasting PlunkeĴ’s lack of exit rules, standard-seĴing enables a greater chance
for speakers to arrive at a solution. That is, as Conceptual Ethics asks, “which concepts
should we use?” the Elasticity Model indicates multiple ways to decide upon which
concepts to use, depending on the operative standards in a MLN’s context. Therefore,
the Elasticity Model arguably helps Conceptual Ethics more than PlunkeĴ’s model, as
it possesses three advantages: coherence, unity, and practicality. As I demonstrated,
the Elasticity Model can unify projects towards common goals, such as furthering so-
cial justice, because interlocutors can find solutions. Thus, for the “sparse and scaĴered
field”53 of Conceptual Ethics, the unity the Elasticity Model could provide, especially
if further developed, is a virtue.
11 Objections and Replies
The ElasticityModel faces numerous challenges, which the below objections highlight.
Moreover, these objections are not exhaustive, so I welcome additional comments for
refinement.
What if different MLN groups decide upon a different expressed proposition for an uĴer-
ance?
The groups need to engage in MLN with each other, in order to re-negotiate an ut-
terance’s expressed proposition (and, thus, what is saliently said in their new MLN).
Hopefully, their MLN can enable them to eventually converge on one expressed pro-
position.
What if an interlocutor sticks to another expressed proposition?
Perhaps she should not participate in MLNs. As PlunkeĴ notes, being aware of
engaging inMLNs is rare, so awillingness to explicitly participate in, and accept, MLN
52. Making such choices may reduce projects’ diversity, a potentially negative implication.
53. Burgess and PlunkeĴ, “Conceptual Ethics I,” 1096.
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is arguably required. The reluctance to agree with a solution underscores the need for
negotiation rules, especially if MLN becomesmore popular (as a research interest) and
accepted as a phenomenon (philosophically and socially).
The Elasticity Model faces PlunkeĴ’s scope issues.
I agree and bite the bullet: perhaps most disputes are MLNs. I agree with PlunkeĴ
that determining MLN’s scope is difficult, especially if we are still developing more
coherent criteria. Nonetheless, I hope to have shown how the Elasticity Model avoids
PlunkeĴ’s dilemma, which I identified as the major weakness of PlunkeĴ’s model.
Does the ElasticityModel’s speech act pluralist-nature still align it with Conceptual Ethics’
question of “which concepts should we use?”
Yes. For the Elasticity Model, the above question is asked in virtue of an uĴerance’s
expressed propositions (embedding concepts) and which of these holds depends on a
given MLN’s purpose(s).
What about scenarios exploring an uĴerance’s indefinite expressed propositions? Is this an
endless dispute?
The Elasticity Model needs more conceptual work to answer this question prop-
erly. However, if one adheres to a speech act pluralist approach, perhaps MLNs are
just incredibly intractable (therefore, also wide in scope) because of the one-many say-
ing relation. Thence, we may need to simplify and choose for the purposes of our
negotiations.
Speech Act Pluralism just gives us what a sentence is saying, not what a sentence should
be saying. So, the Elasticity Model is insufficiently normative.
This objection initially makes a good point; however, it overlooks that what is sa-
liently said is partly determined by normative maĴers concerning which expressed
propositions we should be using. Thus, I believe the Elasticity Model is sufficiently
normative.
12 Conclusion
I have argued that the extent to which MLN can help Conceptual Ethics, in terms of
unifying Conceptual Ethics’ projects to achieve shared goals, depends on which MLN
model we utilise. I introduced Conceptual Ethics and discussed PlunkeĴ’s MLN cri-
teria. Although I identified C4 as crucial for MLN, as MLN’s normativity connects
MLN toConceptual Ethics and highlights our disputes’ (potentially) normative dimen-
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sion, I raised two objections and analysed their implications through examples, focus-
ing on PlunkeĴ’s dilemma. Prior to discarding PlunkeĴ’s model, I considered tackling
the dilemma through Simple Contextualism. However, I found Simple Contextual-
ism more helpful for a meaning sameness rather than a meaning difference model.
As using Simple Contextualism for MLN would force me to deem all words context-
sensitive, I rejected this idea and proposed the Elasticity Model.
First, I qualified my proposal and introduced the Elasticity Model’s Speech Act
Pluralismbackground. Thereafter, I demonstrated how the ElasticityModel could help
Conceptual Ethics more than PlunkeĴ’s model, including avoiding its limitations and
solving the missing link. Through a key example, I found the Elasticity Model to entail
the potential to help Conceptual Ethics projects, especially those on the same concept,
unify more towards goals philosophers may share, albeit with numerous limitations. I
then considered some of these limitations as objections. Overall, I hope to have presen-
ted the ElasticityModel as a viable starting-point for developing amore coherentMLN
model.
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